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Properties of Pareto-Efficient Contracts and Regulations
for Road Franchising
Zhijia Tan, Hai Yang* and Xiaolei Guo
Department of Civil Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science & 
Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, P.R. China
Abstract
Private provision of public roads through build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts is 
increasing around the world. This paper investigates the properties of Pareto-efficient
BOT contracts using a bi-objective programming approach under perfect information. 
Under certain conventional assumptions, we find that for any Pareto-efficient BOT 
contract: (1) the concession period should be set to be the whole road life; (2) the 
volume-capacity ratio (or the road service quality) and the average social cost per trip
are constantly equal to those at the social optimum whenever there are constant 
returns to scale in road construction. Extensions are made to the cases with increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale in road construction. A variety of regulatory regimes are 
investigated to analyze the behavior of the profit-maximizing private firm, and 
efficient regulations, including demand and markup charge regulations, are elucidated
for both the public and private sectors to achieve a predetermined Pareto-optimal
outcome.
Keywords: Private road; Road franchising; Pareto efficiency; Regulation.
1. Introduction
Private-sector participation in road construction and operations has the advantages of 
efficiency gains, private financing, and better identification of attractive investment 
projects. Such participation is generally implemented through a build-operate-transfer 
(BOT) contract, under which a private firm builds and operates roads in a road 
network at its own expense, and in return receives the revenue from road tolls for a 
number of years, and then these roads are transferred to the government. Such 
commercial and private provision of public roads has attracted growing interest in 
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recent years and such plans are being used to finance modern road systems worldwide
(Roth, 1996). Private-sector participation in the form of BOT franchises has worked 
well in a number of projects such as road tunnels in Hong Kong. In mainland China, 
many local, mainly municipally affiliated companies have undertaken the 
development of toll roads in recent years, often in joint ventures with Hong Kong 
investors (Tam, 1998). Once road provision is market driven, many issues must be
carefully addressed, because the interests of the private sector are different from those 
of the public sector. From the viewpoint of private investors, the profitability of a 
project is of great concern because private firms are put at risk. From the viewpoint of 
the public sector, it is meaningful to assess whether the construction of a road will 
lead to a positive welfare gain and also be profitable so that private provision is 
worthwhile.
Most previous analyses of road investment have focused on capacity choices and 
setting tolls and the resulting profitability and social welfare gain. The concession 
period and/or road life is usually assumed to be given; the prorated unit cost of 
capacity per unit period is thus also given (either a constant or increasing or 
decreasing with capacity). For comprehensive reviews, the reader may refer to 
Lindsey and Verhoef (2001), Yang and Huang (2005), and Lindsey (2006). An 
important result in the early literature is the self-financing theorem for congestion 
pricing and capacity choice of a single road in a first-best environment, in which the 
toll is set equal to the difference between the marginal social cost and the marginal 
private cost of a trip (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Keeler and Small, 1977). In a 
general traffic equilibrium context, Yang and Meng (2000) looked into the 
profitability and social welfare gain of a single BOT road in a network; various 
economic regimes were examined, including the regime with profitable and positive 
welfare increment, the regime with unprofitable but positive welfare increment, and 
the regime with unprofitable and negative welfare increment. Yang and Meng (2002) 
further showed that, under essentially the same conditions as in Mohring and 
Harwitz’s (1962) model of a single link, the self-financing result still holds for each 
road individually in a full new network and consequently for the network in aggregate, 
provided that each link is optimally priced and all capacities are optimized. If one or 
more new roads are introduced to an existing network, the self-financing result also 
holds for each new link individually, even if the existing links do not have optimal 
capacities, as long as all existing and new links are optimally priced and the capacities 
of the new links are optimally selected (Proost et al., 2004; Verhoef and Rouwendal, 
2004; Yang and Huang, 2005). Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) addressed some 
implications of second-best congestion pricing on the applicability of the 
self-financing theorem using a numerical experiment approach. Verhoef (2007) and 
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) analyzed capacity choice and toll setting by private 
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investors in a competitive bidding framework organized by the government. They 
considered capacity and toll selection based on various criteria (maximizing capacities
or patronage, minimizing tolls or toll revenues) and compared the resulting welfare 
gains (or losses) from each criterion.
Engel et al. (1997, 2001) suggested that the fixed-term contract suffers certain pitfalls 
with traffic and revenue uncertainties and proposed a flexible term contract for road 
franchising. In the line of Engel et al. (1997), Nombela and de Rus (2004) discussed a
new franchising mechanism based on a flexible-term contract and bi-dimensional bids 
for total net revenue. Recently, Guo and Yang (2008) conducted a preliminary study 
on the selection of the concession period with deterministic demand and 
homogeneous users. They incorporated all three essential variables (concession period, 
road capacity and toll charge) and explicitly considered traffic congestion and demand 
elasticity for unconstrained and profit-constrained, welfare-maximizing BOT 
contracts.
In view of the different interests between the public and private sectors, we consider a 
bi-objective optimization problem for maximizing social welfare and private profit, 
with respect to the three primary variables of concession period, road capacity and toll 
charge, for a given toll road. By assuming that the government and the private firm
both have perfect information on the project cost and future traffic demand, we 
examine the properties of the Pareto-optimal solution set. Each Pareto-optimal
solution dictates a Pareto-efficient BOT contract that leads to an efficient outcome in 
the sense that neither social welfare nor private profit can be further enhanced without 
reducing the other. Moreover, a variety of regulatory mechanisms are investigated to 
analyze the behavior of the profit-maximizing private firm, and efficient regulations 
including demand and mark-up charge regulations are elucidated for both the public 
and private sectors to achieve a predetermined Pareto-optimal outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our bi-objective programming 
formulation of a BOT toll road scheme and the definition of Pareto-efficient contracts.
Some important properties of the set of Pareto-efficient contracts are explored in 
Section 3. A further analysis of the efficiency of a given Pareto-optimal contract in 
comparison with the social optimum is conducted in Section 4. Section 5 extends the 
analysis to the general cases of decreasing and increasing returns to scale in road 
construction. Section 6 investigates a variety of regulatory regimes for the 
government to achieve a predetermined Pareto-efficient contract. Numerical 
examples are used to elucidate our results in Section 7, and, finally, conclusions are 
presented in Section 8.
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2. Basic Definition and Assumption
Assume that the government wants to get a private firm to build a new highway 
whose technical characteristics are exogenous. Let 0y  be the capacity of the new 
road, 0q  be the travel demand and ( )B q be the inverse demand function (or the 
marginal benefit function), and ( , )t q y be the link travel time function. Note that q
and y are measured in the number of vehicles per unit period. The following 
demand-supply equilibrium condition always holds:
   ,B q p t q y  , (1)
where p is the toll charged to each user of the road and  is the value of time to 
convert time into an equivalent monetary cost (we consider homogeneous users only). 
Condition (1) simply means that travel demand for the new road is determined by the 
full price for a trip. Let  I y be the construction cost of the highway as a function of 
capacity. The following assumption is made about  B q ,  I y and  ,t q y
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1.
(a) The inverse demand function,  B q , is a strictly decreasing and differentiable 
function of q for 0q  ;  qB q is a strictly concave function of q for 
0q  .
(b) The road construction cost function,  I y , is a continuously increasing and 
differentiable function of y for 0y  .
(c) The travel time function,  ,t q y , is a continuously differentiable function of
 ,q y for 0q  and 0y  ; for any 0q  ,  ,t q y decreases with y ; for 
any 0y  ,  ,t q y is a convex and increasing function of q .
From equilibrium condition (1), the toll, p , can be viewed as the following function 
of the demand, q , and the capacity, y :
     , ,p q y B q t q y  . (2)
For a given y , the toll, p , is uniquely determined by the demand, q . Therefore, 
determining the variables p and y is essentially equivalent to selecting the 
variables q and y . Hereafter, the demand, q , is substituted for the toll, p , for 
convenience of exposition.
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We first consider the private firm’s problem. Let Tˆ , ˆ 0T  , be the life of the road 
under consideration. The private firm must choose a combination of the BOT 
variables, including the concession period, T , with ˆ0 T T  , the travel demand q
(or equivalently, the toll charge, p ) and the road capacity, y , to maximize its profit,
 , ,P T q y , during the concession period T :
   , ,P T q y Tqp I y  , (3)
where the travel demand, q , is determined by condition (1), the first term of eqn. (3)
is the total toll revenue collected by the private firm during the concession period and 
the second term is the construction cost, which is fully borne by the private firm. With 
eqn. (2), problem (3) can be rewritten as:
       , , ,P T q y TqB q Tqt q y I y   (4)
From Part (c) of Assumption 1 that  ,t q y is convex,  ,qt q y is convex in q for 
any given 0y  . From the strict concavity of  qB q , the profit function,  , ,P T q y ,
is strictly concave in q for any given y and T . For simplicity, we do not adopt an 
interest rate to discount future revenues to their equivalent present values. In fact, the 
use of a discounting rate does not alter our results since both social welfare and profit 
in this study are invariant with the calendar time (see Appendix 1) for the same reason 
given by Guo and Yang (2008).
Next, we consider the government’s problem of choosing the best combination of the 
BOT variables  , ,T q y to maximize the social welfare during the whole road life, 
Tˆ :
         ˆ, , ,W T q y TS q y T T S y I y    , (5)
where  I y is again the construction cost,  ,S q y and  S y are, respectively,
the unit-time social welfare during the concession and post-concession periods and 
determined below.
     
0
, d ,
q
S q y B w w qt q y  ; (6)
       1
1 1
1 1 100 0
max , max  d ,
q
q q
S y S q y B w w q t q y
 
   . (7)
Equation (7) implies that, during the post-concession period, the road capacity is 
given and fixed and the government can select the optimal traffic volume to maximize 
the unit-time social welfare only.
Therefore, the BOT problem can be defined as selecting simultaneously the 
combination of the three variables  , ,T q y to maximize the total social welfare and 
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the private firm’s profit, which can be formulated as the following bi-objective 
programming problem:
 
 
 , ,
, ,
max
, ,T q y
W T q y
P T q y
 
 
 
, (8)
where   ˆ, , : 0 , 0, 0T q y T T q y      and social welfare,  , ,W T q y , and 
profit,  , ,P T q y , are defined by (5) and (4), respectively.
Our task here is to seek the set of the Pareto-efficient solutions of the bi-objective 
optimization problem (8). Since a BOT contract is essentially an outcome of 
negotiation between the government and the private firm and can be characterized by 
a combination of  , ,T q y , we are now ready to define a Pareto-efficient contract for 
the BOT problem (8) as follows.
Definition (Pareto-efficient BOT Contract). A BOT triple  * * *, ,T q y  is 
called a Pareto-efficient contract if there is no other feasible BOT triple  , ,T q y 
such that    * * *, , , ,W T q y W T q y and    * * *, , , ,P T q y P T q y with at least 
one strict inequality.
The Pareto-efficient BOT contract is an important and meaningful concept that 
represents the situation in which no party can be made better off without making the 
other one worse off.
3. Properties of Pareto-efficient BOT Contracts
In this section, we examine the properties of Pareto-efficient contracts in the BOT 
problem (8) under perfect information, namely, the demand and construction costs are 
common knowledge to both the public and the private sectors. We begin with the 
following proposition (a rigorous proof is given in Appendix 2)
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, if a triple  * * *, ,T q y  is a Pareto-efficient
BOT contract, then * ˆT T .
Proposition 1 states that any Pareto-efficient BOT contract requires a whole road life 
concession period. This “lifetime concession period” result seems to be realistic 
because several BOT contracts around the world have been awarded for 99 years, 
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including Highway 407 in Toronto, the Chicago Skyway and the Pocahontas Parkway 
(Virginia Route 495) in Richmond, Virginia.
The economic logic of Proposition 1 becomes clear in the cases of monopoly and 
socially optimal solutions corresponding to the two polar points of the Pareto-efficient
frontier of the bi-objective programming problem (8). First, maximizing the profit for 
a monopoly solution clearly requires as long a concession period as possible since 
profit in each operating period is positive (only the initial road construction costs are 
considered and maintenance and operating costs are ignored). Second, we note that 
the social welfare, given by eqn. (5), comes in the concession and the post-concession 
periods. If the concession period is less than the lifetime of the road, and the capacity 
and price of the road are fixed at their optimal (welfare-maximizing) values, it is a 
matter of indifference for the government how the transfer time is determined. 
However, the firm can reach a higher profit or Pareto improvement can be made when 
the transfer time is extended. In this case, the socially optimal and Pareto-efficient
contracts must extend for the full lifetime of the road. Next, we consider a concession 
period less than the road life for any Pareto-efficient solution other than the monopoly 
and social optimum. Since the franchising firm realizes a positive contribution to its 
profit in each period, extending the concession period will therefore certainly increase 
profits at the prevailing price/capacity that differs from the socially optimal value. 
Such an extension therefore provides room for price and/or capacity changes that are 
more in the interest of social welfare without lowering private profits during the 
concession period. However, there may still be a loss associated with this change. 
Extending the concession period means that the government is no longer able to set a 
welfare-maximizing price during the extension of the concession period. In this case, 
it is not intuitively clear if extending the concession period will result in a net social 
welfare gain, although this is proved mathematically in Appendix 2.
With Proposition 1, it is sufficient to set ˆT T in our subsequent analysis of the 
bi-objective problem (8). To obtain useful insights into Pareto-efficient BOT contracts, 
the following two common assumptions in the literature are introduced and used 
hereafter unless otherwise explicitly noted.
Assumption 2. Link travel time function, t , is homogeneous of degree zero in the 
link flow, q , and the link capacity, y , i.e.,    , ,t q y t q y   for any 0  . 
Clearly, the widely used BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) link travel time functions 
satisfy this assumption. Note that, with this assumption, for any 0y  , 
   , ,1t q y t q y . With a slight abuse of the notation, we denote  ,t q y as  t 
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for convenience, where  , q y  , is the volume-capacity (v/c) ratio. The v/c ratio,
 , is an important index to capture the service quality of the highway: the larger the 
value of  , the longer the travel time and thus the worse the service quality and vice 
versa. Since the concession period extends to the whole road life in the static 
environment considered here, the v/c ratio under a given BOT contract is unchanged 
over time.
Assumption 3. Constant return to scale in road construction, namely,  I y ky , 
where k denotes the constant cost per unit of capacity.
Let  ˆ, ,T q y  and  ˆ, ,T q y be the socially optimal (SO) and monopoly optimal 
(MO) solutions, which maximize social welfare,  ˆ, ,W T q y , and profit,  ˆ, ,P T q y , 
respectively, or they meet the following first-order conditions, respectively:
      0       W B q t t
q
      
   (9)
   2ˆ 0W T t k
y
      

  (10)
and
        0       P B q qB q t t
q
        
(11)
   2ˆ 0P T t k
y
      

, (12)
where  and  denote the SO and MO v/c ratios, respectively, namely, q y   
and q y  . By comparing conditions (10) and (12), it is readily seen that   
from the fact that  2t  is strictly increasing in  and thus both equations have 
the same unique solution of  . More generally, we draw the following conclusion on 
the v/c ratio for any Pareto-efficient BOT contract (refer to Appendix 3 for the proof).
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, the v/c ratio, * , for any Pareto-efficient
BOT contract  * *ˆ, ,T q y solves
   2* *Tˆ t k    . (13)
Thus, it is constant along the Pareto-optimal frontier and equals the socially optimal 
v/c ratio,  .
The v/c ratio,  , governs the travel time or delay of road users. Xiao et al. (2007) 
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compared the service quality levels of a congested highway offered by a 
profit-maximizing monopoly and by the public sector. If users value product quality 
equally (corresponding to homogeneous users with identical values of time), Xiao et 
al. (2007) proved that the monopoly firm would offer the same service quality as the 
public sector, which is in line with the well-known economic findings (Spence, 1975).
Proposition 2 further reveals that the service quality will coincide with that preferred 
by the public sector whenever the BOT contract is Pareto-efficient.
The structure of Pareto-efficient BOT contracts turns out to be very simple from 
Propositions 1 and 2: it includes a whole road-life concession period, Tˆ , and a 
constant v/c ratio,  . We define the contract curve in the demand-capacity space or 
the Pareto-optimal solution set of problem (8) (with concession period ˆT T ) as:
    * * * *ˆ,  , ,  is a Pareto optimal solution of problem (8)q y T q y  (14)
Any efficient bargaining between the public and the private sectors should result in an 
agreement on the contract curve. Any feasible BOT contract off the contract curve 
would be inefficient.
From the assumption that  B q is strictly decreasing and    , we immediately 
obtain q q by comparing eqns. (9) and (11). Note that under Assumptions 1-3, 
both  ˆ, ,W T q y and  ˆ, ,P T q y given by the bi-objective programming problem (8)
are jointly concave in  ,q y , and, thus, the Pareto-optimal solution set is connected 
(Warburton, 1983). Therefore, the contract curve defined by (14) is the portion of the 
line connecting  ,q y and  ,q y  with slope  . Figure 1 shows the contract curve 
and the corresponding Pareto-optimal frontier in the decision space  ,q y and the 
objective space  ,P W as bold curves. The arrows indicate increasing social 
welfare.
For any BOT contract,  , ,T q y , the average social cost (ASC) (per user per unit time 
or per trip during the concession period) is defined as:
     
ASC
Tqt q y I y I yq
t
Tq y Tq
        
. (15)
The ASC does not change over calendar time in the static case considered; it equals 
the sum of two terms: the average travel time (in monetary units) and the construction 
cost allocation per trip. For any Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , by 
Assumption 3 and condition (13), the ASC given by (15) for ˆT T can be 
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calculated as:
   * * *ASC t t     . (16)
From Proposition 2, we readily obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, the average social cost defined by (15) in any 
Pareto-efficient BOT contract  * *ˆ, ,T q y is the same as the socially optimal ASC.
Like the v/c ratio in Pareto-efficient BOT contracts, the ASC is constant along the 
Pareto-efficient frontier and equals the socially optimal ASC. Let 0C denote the 
constant ASC under Pareto-efficient BOT contracts. From eqn. (16) and condition (9), 
we have      0C t t B q         . Also, from eqn. (2), condition (9), Assumption 
3 and the definition of ASC in (15), we readily know that in a socially optimal BOT 
contract  ˆ, ,T q y  , the toll charge equals the allocation of the construction cost per 
trip:
     ˆ
I y
p B q t
Tq
     

.
The toll revenue just covers the construction cost of the road, which is the classical 
self-financing result (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962). However, for any other
Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , other than the socially optimal contract 
with *q q  ,
   * 0B q B q C  , (17)
which means that the average generalized travel cost would exceed the average social 
cost. By subtracting the average travel time (in monetary units) on both sides of 
inequality (17), we have:
           
*
* *
*ˆ ˆ
I yI y
p B q t B q t
Tq Tq
        

. (18)
The last two equalities follow the result from Proposition 2. Equation (18) reveals that 
the Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , with *q q  will be strictly profitable. 
Hence, we can view the corresponding toll charge, *p , as the sum of two distinct 
parts: one for recovering the road construction cost, denoted as 1p , and the other for 
gaining profits on the investment, denoted as 2p and called the markup charge.
From condition (13), 1p can be expressed as
         
2* * * * * *
* * *
1 * *
ˆ ,
ˆ ˆ
I y T t y t q y
p t q
qTq Tq
           . (19)
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Thus, for any Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , 1p is constantly equal to 
the socially optimal toll since *   and it exactly equals the congestion externality.
The markup charge imposed on each trip, 2p , can be calculated as
       * * * * * *2 1 0p p p B q t t B q C         , (20)
where the last equality follows from Proposition 3.
From the above analysis, we have clear knowledge of the profitability of a private 
road when a Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , is awarded to a private firm: 
the private firm invests * 1Tˆq p and earns a profit equal to 
*
2Tˆq p . In particular, with a 
socially optimal BOT contract,  ˆ, ,T q y  , 2 0p  and the profit is nil. These 
observations are illustrated geometrically in Figure 2.
4. The Efficiency of Pareto-efficient BOT Contracts
In this section, we devote our analysis to the divergence between the socially optimal 
BOT contract and the other Pareto-efficient BOT contracts in terms of the realized 
social welfare. The degree of divergence is measured by the following ratio of social 
welfare:
*
1.0
W
W
  

, (21)
where *W is the total social welfare realized under a Pareto-efficient BOT contract,
 * *ˆ, ,T q y , and  ˆ, ,W W T q y   is the maximized social welfare in a socially
optimal solution.
From Proposition 3 and after simple manipulation, we have
    ** * * 00ˆ, d
q
W W q y T B w C w     
and 
     00ˆ, dqW W q y T B w C w      .
Thus, the efficiency ratio,  , can be expressed as:
  
  
*
00
00
d
d
q
q
B w C w
B w C w

 


 
. (22)
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It is noted that any Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , of problem (8) must 
uniquely solve the following scalar programming problem (Geoffrion, 1967):
 
     
ˆ, , ,
max 1 , , , ,
T q y T T
W T q y P T q y
 
    , (23)
where  0,1 is a weighting parameter of social welfare and profit. From 
Propositions 2 and 3, we readily obtain
   * * * 0B q q B q C   , (24)
which can be rearranged as
 
*
*
*
*
0*
B
q
B
q
C E
B q
E

 
, (25)
where 
*
*
B
q
E is the point price elasticity of demand at   * *,B q q , defined by
 
   
*
*
*
* *
  0B
q
B q
E
q B q
  . (26)
On the other hand, function   00 d
q
B w C w is strictly concave in q (because 
 B  is a decreasing function) and thus has a unique maximum at q q  . Note that
 * 0,q q  , and thus *q , can be expressed as a convex combination of 0 and q :
* *
* 1 0
q q
q q
q q
       

 
.
From the concavity of   00 d
q
B w C w , we readily have
     *
*
0 00 0
d d
q qq
B w C w B w C w
q
     ,
which implies that
  
  
*
*
00
00
d
d
q
q
B w C w q
qB w C w

  


  
. (27)
We rewrite the last term of eqn. (27) as
   
   
 
*
**
** *
1
1 1
q
q B q B qq q
qB q B q B q

      
 

. (28)
Substituting eqn. (25) and   0B q C into eqn. (28) gives rise to
*
*
* *
* *
* B
q
B B
q q
sh
Eq
q E E
  
 
, (29)
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where 
*
*
B
q
shE is the price elasticity of demand measured by a shrinkage ratio at 
  * *,B q q and   ,B q q  and defined by
   
   **
**
**
  0B
q
sh
B qq q
E
qB q B q
 



. (30)
The bound of the efficiency ratio,  , associated with a Pareto-efficient BOT contract 
can be stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-3, for any Pareto-efficient BOT contract,
 * *ˆ, ,T q y , the efficiency ratio defined by (21) is bounded by
1
1.0
1
   
(31)
where  0,1 satisfies condition (24) and * ** * 0B Bq qshE E   .
From this proposition, the bound of the efficiency ratio for a Pareto-efficient BOT 
contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , can be determined by the weighting parameter,  , of social 
welfare and profit associated with  * *ˆ, ,T q y and parameter  , which depends on 
the convexity of the benefit function.
With a convex benefit function  B q or 0B  , we can further tighten the lower 
bound explicitly. In this case, we have the following two inequalities (a graphical
illustration can be found in Xiao et al., 2007):
        * * * * * *0 00 1d 02
q
B w C w q q B q B q C q     
and
       * * *0 010 d 2
q
q
B w C w q q B q C       .
Based on the relationship between the above two inequalities,
0 &  0   
a a
a a b b
a b a b
     
 
and in view of definition (22), we immediately obtain
     
          
* * * * *
0
* * * * * * *
0 0
1
2
1 1
2 2
q q B q B q C q
q q B q B q C q q q B q C
  
 
     
. (32)
By rewriting (24) as
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   * * *0B q C q B q  
and substituting it into (32), we have
2
1
2 1.0
1
2 2
 
     
.
which is a bound that is tighter than that given by (31).
With a linear benefit function, 1  and (32) is strictly equal. Thus, the bound of the 
efficiency ratio can be simply reduced to
2
1
3 2 1.0
1 14
2 2
 
   
   
.
The lower bound 3 4 corresponds to the monopoly situation with 1  , which is 
consistent with that derived in Xiao et al. (2007); the upper bound 1.0 corresponds to 
the socially optimal situation with 0  . When a BOT toll road is faced with a 
trade-off parameter of 0.5  , the efficiency ratio can be calculated as 8 9  .
5. Effects of Returns to Scale in Road Construction
So far, we have examined the properties and the efficiency of Pareto-efficient
contracts under constant returns to scale in road construction by assuming that 
 I y ky . To look into the effects of decreasing and increasing returns to scale in 
road construction, we now relax Assumption 3 to consider the following specific 
construction cost function
  , 0I y ky   . (33)
Road construction exhibits decreasing returns to scale when 1  and increasing 
returns to scale when 0 1   . 
5.1 Properties of Pareto-efficient BOT contracts with returns to scale
We now examine how the returns to scale in road construction affect the properties of
the Pareto-efficient BOT contract set. From Proposition 1, we know that ˆT T for 
any Pareto-efficient BOT contract. Let  ˆ, ,T q y  and  ˆ, ,T q y be the SO and MO 
solutions, which maximize social welfare,  , ,W T q y , and profit,  , ,P T q y , 
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respectively. By subtracting  ˆ, ,P T q y from  ˆ, ,W T q y , we readily obtain
        0ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , dqW T q y P T q y T B w w qB q   . (34)
Note that the term on the right-hand-side of eqn. (34) is strictly increasing in q , 
which implies that q q , because, if q q , then
          0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , d , ,qW T q y P T q y T B w w qB q W T q y      , (35)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that  ˆ, ,T q y maximizes profit,
 , ,P T q y . Equation (35) contradicts the assumption that  ˆ, ,T q y  is the 
welfare-maximizing solution.
Suppose that  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a Pareto-efficient BOT contract. Like the constant returns
to scale case,  * *,q y solves the Lagrange problem (55) (shown in Appendix 3) for a 
certain Lagrange multiplier,  , and taking the derivative in y yields the following 
first-order condition:
     2 1* * *Tˆ t k y      , (36)
where * * *q y  is the v/c ratio under the Pareto-efficient BOT contract  * *ˆ, ,T q y . 
Equation (36) under assumption (33) is the counterpart of the Pareto-efficiency 
condition (13) associated with  I y ky .
The following proposition reveals a few important properties of Pareto-efficient BOT 
contracts (a rigorous proof is given in Appendix 4). Their departure from the case 
with constant returns to scale in road construction is self-evident.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any two distinct Pareto-efficient BOT 
contracts,  * *ˆ, ,T q y and  ** **ˆ, ,T q y , with * **q q , we must have
(a) * **y y , * **p p ;
(b) * **   and * **ASC ASC for 1  ; * **   and * **ASC ASC for 
0 1   , where ASC is the average social cost defined by (15);
(c) * **P P , * **W W ;
(d) * **ROR ROR , where ROR is the rate of return on investment defined as the 
ratio of the profit to the construction cost
  100%PROR
I
  . (37)
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The properties of the contract curve,  , defined by (14) are explained geometrically 
in Figure 3. Along the direction shown in the figure, the travel demand, road capacity 
and social welfare increase, while the profit decreases. However, the v/c ratio 
increases when 1  (decreasing returns to scale) and decreases when 0 1  
(increasing returns to scale). As a result, the service quality decreases or increases
along the Pareto-efficient frontier from monopoly to the social optimum, namely, the 
private firm tends to offer higher or lower service quality than the socially optimal 
level. 
5.2 The profit properties at the social optimum
We go further to investigate the profit properties of the socially optimal BOT contract,
 ˆ, ,T q y  . In this case, the toll charge is exactly equal to the congestion externality,
     p B q t t         .
From eqn. (36), the profit of the private sector can be expressed as
1 ˆ1P Tqp
    
  , (38)
which reveals that, with as socially optimal BOT contract,  ˆ, ,T q y  , the private firm 
would earn a positive profit with decreasing returns to scale in road construction 
( 1  ); zero profit with constant returns to scale ( 1  ); and negative profit with 
increasing returns to scale ( 0 1   ). The profit (positive or negative) is proportional 
to the total toll revenue with a proportional constant, (1 1  ). Equation (38) also 
implies that the cost recovery ratio (total toll revenue relative to the initial capacity 
cost) is exactly equal to  , which is consistent with the general rules derived by 
Mohring and Harwitz (1962).
5.3 The zero-profit constrained Pareto-efficient BOT contract
From the above analysis, the private sector would encounter a negative profit with a 
socially optimal BOT contract  ˆ, ,T q y  , when there are increasing returns to scale in 
road construction ( 0 1   ). In this case it is of interest to look into the 
zero-profit-constrained Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,zp zpT q y , where “zp” 
stands for “zero-profit”.
Before we seek such a zero-profit contract,  * *ˆ, ,zp zpT q y , we provide the conditions
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for its existence. Clearly, this requires that the profit of the private sector with a 
monopoly optimal BOT contract,  ˆ, ,T q y , be positive. In this case, by combining 
eqn. (2) and eqn. (36), the monopoly profit can be calculated as:
       ˆ ˆ, ,P T q y Tq B q t t         . (39)
Note that, for any road capacity, 0y  , when 0q  , the average travel time 
approaches the free-flow travel time,  0t , and the congestion externality approaches 
zero. Therefore,  ˆ, , 0P T q y  is guaranteed under the following condition:
   0 0 0B t  . (40)
Intuitively, condition (40) is not practically restrictive, because we can reasonably 
expect that there is a positive potential traffic demand with a free-flow travel time. 
Otherwise, it is meaningless to build a new highway. 
When condition (40) is met, there exists a Pareto-efficient contract,  * *ˆ, ,zp zpT q y , with 
zero profit for 0 1   . In this case, the solution,  * *,zp zpq y , or equivalently 
 * *,zp zpq  can be determined by eqn. (36) and the following zero-profit condition:
        * * * * * *ˆ, 0zp zp zp zp zp zpP q y Tq B q t I y     .
The corresponding toll charge is given by
       * * * * * * *1zp zp zp zp zp zp zpp B q t t t          . (41)
The charge is thus higher than the corresponding congestion externality for cost 
recovery. With increasing returns to scale in road construction, the zero-profit 
Pareto-efficient contract,  * *ˆ, ,zp zpT q y , with projection  * *,zp zpq y in the  ,q y space 
shown in Figure 3(b), is thus a critical point; any Pareto-efficient contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y ,
with * *zpq q would result in a positive profit for the private firm. Otherwise, the 
profit becomes negative.
6. Governmental Regulations
So far, we have examined the basic properties of Pareto-efficient BOT contracts for a
road project. In this section, we focus on the regulatory mechanism that induces the 
private firm to choose a predetermined Pareto-optimal solution voluntarily, and we 
identify the regulatory regime that establishes a situation in which the regulatory 
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outcomes are efficient. In all regulations considered below, we assume that the 
government already predetermines a targeted Pareto-efficient BOT contract, 
 * *ˆ, ,T q y or  * *ˆ, ,T p y , where
       * * * * * *p B q t q y B q t     . (42)
6.1 Rate-of-return regulation
We first investigate a rate-of-return (ROR) regulatory mechanism, under which the 
private firm is allowed to earn no more than a “fair” rate of return on its investment. 
The private firm is free to choose a combination of the BOT variables as long as its 
profits do not exceed this fair rate.
Let s denote the ROR on the firm’s investment and *s , * 0s  , be the ROR 
determined by (37) for a given Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y . Under the 
ROR regulation, the government restricts the ROR on the investment of the private 
firm as follows:
 
 
*Tqp I ys s
I y
  . (43)
Under the above ROR regulation, the problem of the profit-maximizing private firm 
can be expressed as:
 
ˆ0 , 0, 0
max  
T T p y
Tpq I y
   
 (44)
subject to condition (43). Now we have the following proposition disclosing the 
behavior of the private sector under the ROR regulation (43) (the proof is relegated to 
Appendix 5).
Proposition 6. Let  * *ˆ, ,T q y be a non-monopoly Pareto-efficient solution with a 
corresponding ROR *s . Then, under the ROR regulation (43), the private sector
would choose a non-Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  ˆ, ,T q y , with *q q and 
*y y .
Proposition 6 states that the private sector’s choice deviates from the Pareto-efficient
outcome. Meanwhile, the resulting v/c ratio, *q y    , or the service quality of 
the highway under the ROR regulation (43) will be higher than the Pareto-efficient
level. Since the private sector makes more profit than at the Pareto-efficient level, we 
have
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   * * *ˆ ˆTpq I y Tp q I y   . (45)
Equation (45) implies that *p p from the strictly increasing assumption of  I  .
In summary, the ROR regulation is inefficient since the private firm would select a 
higher road capacity and a higher toll level than the targeted Pareto-efficient BOT 
solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y . It is worth noting that the ROR regulation creates an incentive 
for the private sector to choose an inefficiently high capacity. This over-investment is, 
in fact, an instance of the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962).
6.2 Price-cap regulation
The price-cap regulation allows the private sector to set a price below or equal to a
price ceiling set by the government. For a targeted Pareto-efficient BOT solution,
 * *ˆ, ,T q y , the toll ceiling, *p , is given by (42). In this case one can easily see that
the private firm will choose the concession period to be Tˆ whenever the solution, 
 * *ˆ, ,T q y , is profitable and selects a toll equal to *p . Therefore, under the price-cap 
regulation constraint, the private firm’s problem is to maximize its profit as given 
below:
 *
0, 0
ˆmax  
q y
P Tp q I y
 
 
subject to     *B q t q y p  . By viewing y as a function of q and taking the 
derivative of P in q at *q q , we have
   
*
* * *
* * *
* * *
d
d
q q
P q q q
B q q B q t t
q y y y
             
.
If the targeted Pareto-efficient solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , is the MO solution, then the 
private firm will choose  * *ˆ, ,T q y straightforwardly to maximize its profits.
If  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a non-MO Pareto-efficient solution, we must have d d 0P q  at 
*q q for the following reason. First, note that d d 0P q  at *q q is excluded 
since it is a non-MO solution. If, however, d d 0P q  at *q q , then increasing q
from *q will increase profits and social welfare from (34). Therefore, the private 
sector would select  ˆ, ,T q y with *q q to earn more profits under the price cap 
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regulation of *p p . In addition, from the binding price-cap constraint, it is clear to 
see that *   , and, as a result, that *y y . 
In summary, the price-cap regulation is also inefficient and cannot induce the private 
firm to choose a Pareto-efficient BOT solution unless the targeted Pareto-efficient
contract is the MO solution. Generally, under the price-cap regulation, the private 
sector would offer lower road capacity and lower service quality than would the 
Pareto-efficient solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y .
6.3 Capacity regulation
For any Pareto-efficient BOT solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , from Proposition 5, *y y ,
which means that it is pointless to regulate *y y because the private firm would 
surely choose the monopoly optimal  ˆ, ,T q y . Thus, in what follows, we examine
the behavior of the private firm under the capacity regulation of  *y y y  only.
To be practically sensible, we suppose that the government predetermines a profitable 
target solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , in setting up the capacity regulation. In this case, the 
private sector will certainly choose the concession period to be Tˆ . Clearly, at any 
capacity level, the best response of the private firm is to set a monopoly price; that is, 
for any 0y  , the private firm will choose demand q such that the first-order 
condition (11) is satisfied. Viewing q as a function of y given by (11) and taking
the derivative of profit, P ,       ˆP Tq B q t q y I y   , in y gives rise to
 
2
d d ˆ
d d
P P q P P q q
T t I y
y q y y y y y
                     
, (46)
where 0P q   from the first-order condition (11). If the private sector chooses 
 ˆ, ,T q y with *y y to maximize its profits, then d d 0P y  in (46), or the
Pareto-efficiency condition (36) is satisfied. With eqn. (11), we conclude that 
 ˆ, ,T q y is the MO Pareto-efficient contract with *y y , which conflicts with Part 
(a) of Proposition 5. Therefore, under the capacity regulation of *y y , the private 
sector must choose *y y .
Conditional on *y y , if the private firm can increase profits by lowering the toll, 
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the demand will increase and social welfare will increase as well, contradicting the 
Pareto efficiency of  * *ˆ, ,T q y . The private firm would not choose *p p either, 
because, otherwise,  * *ˆ, ,T q y must be the MO Pareto-efficient contract for the 
same reason above. Therefore, the private sector will choose a profit-maximizing toll 
that is certainly higher than *p conditional on *y y . Meanwhile, the service 
quality is made higher than the Pareto-efficient level.
6.4 Demand regulation
Under the demand regulation by the government for a targeted Pareto-efficient
solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , the private firm is allowed to make choices subject to the 
resulting realized traffic volume level, *q q .
Like before, we consider the practically meaningful case that the solution  * *ˆ, ,T q y
is profitable. The private firm will choose the concession period to be Tˆ . From eqn.
(34), we can see that there is no strictly profitable deviation from the Pareto-efficient
solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , for the private firm to choose  ˆ, ,T q y with *q q , because
the social welfare must be improved under constraint *q q whenever the profit is 
increased, which contradicts the Pareto-optimality of  * *ˆ, ,T q y .
We further confirm that the Pareto-efficient BOT solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , is unique and 
maximizes private profits under regulation *q q . Since there is no profitable 
deviation, any choice of  ˆ, ,T q y by the private sector must realize the same profit 
and social welfare as  * *ˆ, ,T q y , simultaneously, namely,
     * *
0
ˆ d ,
q q
T B w w qt I y W q y
y
         (47)
and
     * *ˆ ,qT qB q qt I y P q y
y
        
. (48)
From Definition 1, we know that  ˆ, ,T q y is Pareto-efficient. Subtracting eqn. (48)
from eqn. (47) on each side gives rise to:
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         * *
0 0
d d
q q
B w wB q w B w wB q w    . (49)
Note that function    
0
d
q
B w w qB q is strictly increasing in q . Thus, eqn. (49)
implies that *q q . By substituting *y q  into condition (36), we readily obtain 
*   , and thus *y y . Therefore, under demand regulation *q q , the 
Pareto-efficient solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , is the unique profit-maximizing BOT solution 
to be selected by the private firm.
Proposition 7. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the resulting choice by the private firm
under the demand regulation, *q q , is  * *ˆ, ,T q y or Pareto-efficient.
Proposition 7 shows that the demand regulation is an appealing regulatory choice. The 
government needs only to set a minimum level of demand and to let the private firm
freely choose a preferable combination of road capacity, toll charge and concession 
period for profit maximization.
6.5 Markup charge regulation
Under a markup charge regulation, the firm is allowed to earn a certain amount of 
profit on each unit of output it sells in an economic setting. This is equivalent to the 
return-on-output (ROO) regulation (Train, 1991). In the earlier special case with 
constant returns to scale in road construction, the markup charge, 2p , is given by (20). 
In the general case, the markup charge can be defined as
 
2
, ,P T q y
p
Tq
 ,
which means that the markup charge is the amount of profit earned from each unit of 
realized demand (each trip) during the concession period. For a given Pareto-efficient
BOT contract  * *ˆ, ,T q y , the markup charge regulation refers to setting a ceiling of 
the markup charge during the concession period as follows:
 * **
2 2 *
ˆ, ,
ˆ
P T q y
p p
Tq
  (50)
From Proposition 7, we know that *q q for the private sector to earn more profit. 
In view of ˆT T , it is impossible for the private firm to choose  , ,T q y to earn 
more profit under (50), namely, 
   * * * *2 2ˆ ˆ, , , ,P T q y Tqp Tq p P T q y  
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for any  , ,T q y under the markup charge regulation condition (50). We thus have 
the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the resulting choice by the private firm 
under the markup charge regulation, *2 2p p , is  * *ˆ, ,T q y or Pareto-efficient.
Proposition 8 reveals an alternative regulatory regime for the government to induce 
Pareto-optimal outcomes just by restricting the markup charge and letting the private 
firm choose any combination of the BOT variables.
6.6 Summary of regulatory outcomes and alternative auction strategies
For a targeted Pareto-efficient solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , the outcomes of the five 
alternative regulatory regimes examined so far are summarized in Table 1, where 
   * * * *p B q t q y  ,    * * * *ˆROR , ,P T q y I y and  * * * *2 ˆ ˆ, ,p P T q y Tq .
The results of ROR and price-cap regulations are actually instances of the general 
results in economic settings (Train, 1991). 
Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) discussed the efficiencies of various auction mechanisms 
for a private road with an un-tolled alternative through numerical examples. Their 
simulation results revealed that the auction to minimize generalized travel costs and 
subsidies divided by total traffic demand would approach the social optimum (they 
called it the second-best outcome), and the auction to minimize generalized travel 
costs could result in the social optimum with the zero-profit constraint (the 
second-best outcome with the zero-profit constraint). For a single road with constant 
returns to scale in road construction, the social optimums with and without the 
zero-profit constraint are identical. Therefore, the auction to minimize generalized 
travel costs does approach the social optimum, which is equivalent to maximizing
travel demands. Proposition 7 shows that, for a more general construction cost 
function, any Pareto optimum including the social optimum can be achieved via the 
demand regulation, and Proposition 8 is an alternative to the demand regulation.
7. Numerical Examples
In this section, three simple examples with different returns to scale in road 
construction are presented to demonstrate the results obtained so far. The following 
BPR link travel time function is used:
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 
4
0, 1.0 0.15
q
t q y t
y
         
,
where the free-flow travel time for the new highway is 0 0.5t  (h). Time is 
converted into money with a value of time of 100  (HK$/h). The benefit function 
takes the following negative exponential form:
  1 ln ,   0qB q b
b Q
     
,
where Q is the potential demand, 41.0 10Q   (veh/h), b is a scaling parameter 
reflecting the sensitivity of demand to the full trip price, 0.04b  . It is easy to check 
that the benefit function satisfies Assumption 1(a). The construction cost function for 
the highway is assumed to take the following power form of capacity:
  0 , 0I y k t y   ,
where parameter  captures the returns to scale in road construction: increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) with 0 1   , constant returns to scale (CRS) with 1  and 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS) with 1  , as mentioned before. The free-flow 
travel time, 0t , is proportional to the length of the road and k is the construction 
cost parameter corresponding to the returns to scale,  . The values of parameter 
and k in Table 2 are used without necessarily representing a realistic setting. Finally, 
the road life, Tˆ , is assumed to be 30 (years), or 5ˆ 1.314 10T   (h) by assuming the
number of operating hours per year to be 4380 12 365  (h).
For the three cases with increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale (denoted 
as IRS, CRS and DRS, respectively) listed in Table 2, we first view the maximized 
social welfare with a certain profit constraint,  , ,P T q y P  , as a parametric 
function of the concession period, T . Namely, we look at the result of the following 
maximization problem for any predetermined concession period:
      max
0, 0
max , , : , ,
q y
W T W T q y P T q y P
 
   .
Figure 4 shows how the maximized social welfare changes with the concession period, 
T , when 0P  and 90.8 10P   (HK$), respectively. In the figure, it is clear that 
maxW is increasing in T and it reaches the maximum at ˆT T with a binding profit 
constraint of P P  . The Pareto-efficient BOT contract does require the concession 
period to be exactly the whole road life.
Figures 5-7 report the Pareto-optimal solution sets or contract curves in the 
two-dimensional  ,q space, with bold curves connecting the MO and SO points 
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for the three Cases of IRS, CRS and DRS, respectively, where the thick and thin 
contours represent social welfare and profit, respectively. The corresponding 
representative numerical results for MO and SO are shown in Table 3. It is clear that, 
when moving from SO to MO, the service quality decreases (the v/c ratio increases) 
with increasing returns to scale in road construction; it remains unchanged with 
constant returns to scale; and it increases with decreasing returns to scale. For the IRS
case, the zero-profit Pareto-efficient BOT contract,  * *ˆ, ,zp zpT q y , can be readily 
obtained with ˆ 30T  (year), * 1206zpq  (veh/h), *zpy  2399 (veh/h), and the 
corresponding toll charge of * 2.40zpp  (HK$).
Figure 8 compares the outcomes of the private firm’s choices under various regulatory 
regimes in the case with constant returns to scale in road construction (similar results 
can be obtained for the other two cases). For a predetermined Pareto-efficient solution, 
 * *ˆ, ,T q y  (30 years, 849 veh/h, 1230 veh/h), denoted as point A on the contract 
curve, we obtain the corresponding toll charge of *p  9.96 (HK$), the rate of return
of *s  12.16% and the markup charge of *2  3.34 (HK$). The five bold curves, 
1 5~L L , indicate the binding constraints in the  ,q space, associated with the five 
regulatory regimes: (1) * 9.96p p  (HK$); (2) * 12.16s s  (%); (3) 
* 1230y y  (veh/h); (4) * 849q q  (veh/h) and (5) *2 2 3.34p p  (HK$).
The corresponding feasible domains are located above these curves in the  ,q
space. As seen from the figure, each regulatory binding curve is tangent to a profit 
contour; the corresponding profit represents the maximum profit earned by the private 
firm under the given regulatory control. The choices made by the private firms under 
each regulatory regime are identified by the corresponding tangent point, denoted as 
1 5~A A respectively. Specifically, under the price-cap regulation, the private firm
chooses point 1A (30 years, 723 veh/h, 769 veh/h), with a lower capacity and a lower 
service quality, producing a maximum profit of about 84.90 10 (HK$). Under the 
ROR regulation, the private firm chooses point 2A (30 years, 502 veh/h, 1725 veh/h),
with a higher capacity, a higher toll charge and a higher service quality, producing a 
maximum profit of about 85.80 10 (HK$). Under the capacity regulation, the 
private firm chooses point 3A (30 years, 487 veh/h, 1230 veh/h), with a higher toll 
charge and a higher service quality, producing a maximum profit of about 88.90 10
(HK$). In contrast, under the demand and markup charge regulations, the tangent 
points, 4A and 5A , chosen by the private firm, coincide with Point A , or the 
private firm chooses the predetermined Pareto-efficient BOT solution, which is the 
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unique choice to maximize its profits.
8. Conclusions
The concession period, capacity and toll charge are three primary variables for a BOT 
toll road project. They determine the social welfare for the whole society during the 
whole life of the road and the profit of the private firm during the concession period. 
We analyzed the properties of Pareto-efficient BOT contracts via a bi-objective 
programming approach and established several key results. First, any Pareto-efficient
BOT contract requires that the concession period should be the whole life of the road. 
Secondly, with constant returns to scale, the volume-capacity ratio and thus the 
service quality at any Pareto-efficient BOT contract coincide with the socially optimal 
levels; and the average social cost per trip is also constant along the Pareto-optimal
frontier. We further established the efficiency bound of any Pareto-efficient BOT 
contract in terms of social welfare in comparison with the perfect social optimum. 
With a simple extension of the construction cost function, we proved that the private 
firm prefers to offer lower (higher) service quality than the socially optimal level 
when there are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in road construction.
A variety of government regulatory regimes were investigated. Generally, both 
price-cap and rate-of-return regulations result in inefficient outcomes: the private firm
tends to offer a lower road capacity and a lower service quality under the price-cap 
regulation, while it chooses a higher service quality, a higher capacity and a higher 
toll charge under the rate-of-return regulation than under the corresponding 
Pareto-efficient solution. The road capacity regulation is also inefficient. In contrast, 
we proved that both the demand and markup charge regulations lead to Pareto-optimal
outcomes. 
Finally, we now point out that the Pareto-efficient BOT contracts are complete in an 
ideal world without transaction costs, in which future contingencies can be described
explicitly. Therefore, one of the main avenues in our future research is to model 
unforeseen contingencies using the incomplete contracting approach. More
meaningful extensions include developing a model to incorporate the effects of user 
heterogeneity and to identify and allocate the project’s risks among the public and the 
private sectors.
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Appendix 1. Effect of discounting factor
Here we show that the use of a discounting factor on the stream of future revenue 
does not alter our results. Assume time  is continuous and let r be an interest rate 
of reference used for discounting all monetary units to equivalent values at 0  . The 
social welfare (5) and the profit (4) functions should be rewritten as
       
     
ˆ
0
ˆ
, , , d d
1 1 1
                ,
T T
r r
T
rT rT rT
W T q y S q y e S y e I y
e e e
S q y S y I y
r r r
   
  
    
       
  

(51)
         
0
1
, , , d ,
rTT r eP T q y R q y e I y R q y I y
r

      . (52)
Denote  1 rTL e r  and  ˆˆ 1 rTL e r  . Then, the bi-objective programming 
problem (8) would not change. It is clear that our results remain valid.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that  * * *, ,T q y  is a Pareto-efficient BOT contract and * ˆT T . Denote 
1q as the maximizer of  *,S q y given by (6). From the first-order condition, we 
have
     
*
1*
1 1 1
,
, 0
t q y
p B q t q y q
q

     ,
which implies that, if * 1q q , then * ˆT T , because if * ˆT T then  * * *, ,T q y is 
strictly dominated by  * *ˆ, ,T q y , or the private firm can increase its profits by 
prolonging the concession period without changing the interest of the public sector.
We now prove * ˆT T if * 1q q . To see this, we show that any  * * *, ,T q y with 
* ˆT T must not be Pareto-optimal, i.e., it must be dominated by another feasible 
BOT triple. First, from Assumption 1, we know that, for any given 0y  , both the 
unit-time social welfare  ,S q y given by (6) and the following unit-time toll 
revenue
      , ,R q y q B q t q y 
are strictly concave in q . Any convex combination of *q and 1q can be denoted as 
 ** * 11q q q    ,  0,1 .
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From the concavities of  ,S q y and  ,R q y , we have
          ** * * * * *1 1ˆ, , , 1 ,W T q y TS q y TS q y I y      (53)
and
        ** * * * *2, , , 1P T q y TR q y I y     , (54)
where    * * *1 1, ,S q y S q y  and    * * *2 1, ,R q y R q y  . Consider functions
      1 2max 1 , 1 ,1f        
and
      1 2min 1 , 1g        
Note that  f  ,  g  and    f g  all approach 1 when 1 ,  We can 
always choose a  0 0,1  such that     *0 0 ˆf g T T   and  0 0g   since 
*ˆ 1T T  . Let 
 ** * 0T T g 
and, at **T T , inequalities (53) and (54) can be changed to
   ** ** * * * *, , , ,W T q y W T q y ,
   ** ** * * * *, , , ,P T q y P T q y ,
which contradicts the Pareto-optimality of  * * *, ,T q y . The proof is completed.  □
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a Pareto-efficient contract. Then,  * *,q y solves
the following Lagrange problem
     
   
0
*
ˆ, , d
ˆ                   ,
q q
L q y T B w w qt I y
y
q
Tq B q t I y P
y
         
                  

(55)
where  * * *ˆ, ,P P T q y and 0  is the Lagrange multiplier. We have the 
following first-order conditions:
       
 
* ** *
*
* *
* *
ˆ ˆ1 1
ˆ         0
t q yL q q
TB q T t
q y y q
Tq B q
                
  
(56)
and
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   
2 * **
*
ˆ1 0
t q yL q
T k
y y y
             
. (57)
Denote * * *q y  as the v/c ratio. Since 0  , condition (57) can be reduced to
   2* *Tˆ t k    . (58)
Since  t  is strictly convex, eqn. (58) admits a unique solution, which implies that 
*   . This completes the proof.  □
Appendix 4. Proof of Proposition 5
By the definition of  , the Pareto efficiency condition (36) can be rewritten as
     1 1* * *Tˆ t k q     
Note that the function    1Tˆ t    is strictly increasing in  since 0  and 
 t  is increasing and convex. Therefore, for any two distinct Pareto-efficient BOT 
contracts,  * *ˆ, ,T q y and  ** **ˆ, ,T q y , when 1  , * **q q implies that * **   , 
which, from condition (36), implies that * **y y ; while when 0 1   , * **q q
implies that * **   , which yields * **y y . Thus, * **y y for any 0  in (a) is 
obtained. In addition, the average social cost defined by (15) for any a given 
 * *ˆ, ,T q y can be calculated as
   * * * *ASC t t      
Since ASC is a strictly increasing function of  , we thus conclude that (b) is true.
From (34), if * **P P , then * **q q must induce * **W W , which contradicts the 
Pareto-optimality of  * *ˆ, ,T q y . Thus * **P P . Similarly, we also have * **W W
whenever * **q q . Thus, (c) is proved.
From Assumption 1,  B q is strictly decreasing in q and  t  is strictly 
increasing in  . For 1  , from eqn. (2), * **q q and * **   directly derive 
* **p p . To prove the case with 0 1   , using eqn. (36), we first rewrite the profit 
function for a given  * *ˆ, ,T q y as
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 * * * * *ˆP Tq p t       (59)
From (c), we know that * **q q implies that * **P P . Thus, 
   * * * ** ** **p t p t          , (60)
Function  t  is strictly increasing and * **   . We obtain * **p p . Therefore,
* **p p in (a) for any 0  is proved.
Finally, (a) and (c) together imply (d) since the construction cost,  I y , strictly 
increases with y . The whole proof of Proposition 5 is completed.  □
Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 6
We first note that condition (43) is binding under the best response of the private firm 
since *s is a realizable rate-of-return associated with the predetermined 
Pareto-efficient contract,  * *ˆ, ,T q y . We thus have
   *Tqp I y s I y  . (61)
Therefore, under the binding condition (43), the profit-maximizing problem (44) is 
equivalent to maximizing the investment,  I y , or equivalently maximizing the 
capacity, y , since  I y is strictly increasing in y . Now we view y as a function 
of T and q as determined by (61) and p is a function of q given by (2). We 
take the derivatives of y with respect to T and q , yielding
     2* 21 q q y qs I y T t q B q ty y T y
                      
(62)
       2* 21 q q y q q qs I y T t T B q qB q t ty y q y y y
                                
. (63)
If the concession period, T , for maximizing the profit or equivalently for maximizing 
the capacity is an interior point or  ˆ0,T T , then 0y T   . As a result, the 
right-hand side term of eqn. (62) must be zero or we must have  , 0p q y  from eqn. 
(2), which conflicts with the binding condition (43). This means that the private firm 
must choose the concession period to be Tˆ or zero under the ROR regulation (43). 
Clearly, the choice of no concession period is out of question. We thus conclude that 
the private sector will choose a whole road-life concession period, ˆT T , under the 
ROR regulation (43).
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If  * *ˆ, ,T q y happens to be a solution of problem (44), we have 0y q   and 
hence the term in the bracket on the left-hand side of eqn. (63) equals zero, which 
corresponds to the monopoly optimality conditions (11). In addition,  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a 
given Pareto-efficient solution and thus satisfies the Pareto-efficiency condition (36). 
These two observations allow us to conclude that  * *ˆ, ,T q y is the MO solution. 
This conclusion in turn implies that, if  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a non-MO Pareto-efficient
solution, then it must not be the optimal solution of problem (44) or 
   * *ˆ ˆ, , , ,T q y T q y and 0y q   .
If  * *ˆ, ,T q y is a non-MO Pareto-efficient solution, then we have 0y q   at  
 * *ˆ, ,T q y for the following reason. First, 0y q   is excluded from the above 
analysis. In addition, 0y q   at  * *ˆ, ,T q y implies that increasing the demand 
can increase the capacity under condition (61). As a result, the profit,
   *ˆ, ,P T q y s I y , will increase. Also, from eqn. (34), the social welfare must 
strictly increase from  * *ˆ, ,W T q y when both the demand and profit increase. These 
results contradict the fact that  * *ˆ, ,T q y is Pareto-optimal. Therefore, under the 
ROR *s s associated with the given non-MO Pareto-efficient solution,  * *ˆ, ,T q y , 
the private sector will choose a BOT contract,  ˆ, ,T q y , with *q q and *y y . 
Thus, Proposition 6 is proved.  □
Table 1. Summary of Regulatory Outcomes
Regulatory Regime Choices of Private Firm Pareto Efficiency
Price-Cap  *p p *y y , *p p , ˆT T No
Rate of return  *s s *y y , *p p , ˆT T No
Capacity  *y y *y y , *p p , ˆT T No
Demand  *q q *y y , *p p , ˆT T Yes
Markup charge  *2 2p p *y y , *p p , ˆT T Yes
Table 2. Returns to scale in road construction and corresponding parameter values
Returns to scale in 
road construction
Increasing 
returns to scale 
(IRS)
Constant 
returns to scale 
(CRS)
Decreasing 
returns to scale 
(DRS)
 0.80 1.00 1.20
k  610 HK$/h (veh/h) 1.50 1.20 0.25
3. Table
Table 3. Returns to scale in road construction and numerical results for SO and MO
Solution Variable
IRS CRS DRS
SO MO SO MO SO MO
Demand (veh/h) 1230 445 970 357 955 368
Capacity (veh/h) 2448 851 1414 520 1375 549
Toll (HK$) 1.90 27.25 6.65 31.65 6.97 31.05
Social welfare ( 910 HK$) 3.96 2.89 3.19 2.34 3.28 2.47
Profit ( 910 HK$) -0.07 1.43 0 1.18 0.15 1.26
Volume to capacity ratio 0.50 0.52 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.67
ASC (HK$) 52.9 53.4 58.5 58.5 60.5 59.1
ROR (%) -0.8 57.6 0 108.3 20.3 519.2
Markup charge (HK$) -0.45 24.41 0 25.00 1.19 26.03
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Figure 2. A geometric illustration of the Pareto-efficient toll charge, demand and profit
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